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THE IMPLIED CONSPIRACY DOCTRINE AND
DELIVERED PRICING
SumN-ER S. KITrELLE* AND GEORGE P. LAiMt
An important weapon in the Federal Trade Commission's attack on industry-
wide use of delivered pricing methods has been the doctrine of implied conspiracy,
more recently called the doctrine of "conscious parallelism of action."1 Other weap-
ons have been the definition of "price" as the seller's "mill net return,"2 denial of
a seller's right to meet competitive prices "systematically" 3 (or where such meeting
results in injury to competition),4 and direct proof of collusion among competitors
in the adoption, continued use, or alteration of a delivered pricing method.
The trend of advancement of the "conscious parallelism of action" doctrine by
the Commission, with considerable recognition if not approval by reviewing courts,
has now reached a crucial point. Unless the Federal Trade Commission changes
" B.S.C.E. 1931, Purdue University; J.D. 1936, George Washington University. Member of the Dis-
trict of Columbia and New York bars. Contributor to legal and business periodicals.
I B.S. 1931, Purdue University; LL.B. 1935, J.D. 1936, Georgetown University. Member of the
District of Columbia bar. Chairman, American Bar Association Committee on Trade Associations, since
1949.
The authors gratefully acknowledge the assistance in the preparation of this article of Frazer F. Hilder
of the District of Columbia bar, author of The Attack Upon Delivered Price Systems, 14 GEo. WAsH. L.
REV. 397 (1946)-
'The term appears in the Federal Trade Commission's published Noncr TO TorM STAFF: IN RE Com-
MIssION POLICY TowARD GEooaRA~mc PRICING PRACTICES, Oct. 12, 1948, p. 3.
2 The Robinson-Patman bill contained such a definition of "price," but it was withdrawn by the
House Judiciary Committee, 80 CONG. REc. 8102, 8140, 8224 (1936). However, Walter B. Wooden,
as Associate General Counsel for the Commission, tried to argue the definition back into the law by
another route-namely, the argument that sellers are not merely permitted but affirmatively required
to make "only due allowance" for common carrier transportation costs in arriving at delivered prices.
CCH, ROBINSON-PATMAN AcT SYMpOsIuM, SEcTioN ON Fooo, DRUG AND CosE'ric LAw OF Tma NEW
YoRK STATE BAR-Ass'N 79 et seq. (1946). This means that the seller must add to his mill price only
the exact amount of common carrier transportation cost, no more and no less. Some support for the
"mill net return" method of measuring discrimination appears by way of dictum in the Supreme Court's
opinion in Federal Trade Comm'n v. Cement Institute, 333 U. S. 683, 722, 725-726 (1948), wherein the
Court stated: "The Commission held that the varying mill nets received by respondents on sales between
customers in different localities constituted a 'discrimination in price between different purchasers' within
the prohibition of Section 2(a) . . ."; and later: "We hold that the Commission properly concluded
that respondents' pricing system results in price discriminations." The Commission now says it has not
necessarily espoused the "mill net" theory. NoTIcE TO THR STAFF, supra note i, at 5, 6. See also
Dawkins, Defenses Available in Cases of Geographic Price Discriminations, 37 GEo. L. J. 217, 218 et
seq. (1949). But its legal staff still uses the theory in its briefs in pending cases. See letter from
Kittelle to William Simon, February 21, 1949, in Hearings before the Subcommittee of Senate Com-
mittee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on S. 236, 81st Cong., ist Sess. 325 (1949).
'Federal Trade Comm'n v. Cement Institute, 333 U. S. 683, 723-724 (1948); cf. Federal Trade
Comm'n v. A. E. Staley Mfg. Co., 324 U. S. 746, 755-757 (i945).
'Standard Oil Co. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 173 F. 2d 21o (C. C. A. 7th 1949).
'There was such evidence in both Federal Trade Comm'n v. Cement Institute, supra note 3, and
Triangle Conduit & Cable Co. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, i68 F. 2d 175 (C. C. A. 7th 1948), afl'd
per curiam sub non. Clayton Mark & Co. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 336 U. S. 956 (1949), popularly
known as the Rigid Steel Conduit case.
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its policy, or the courts reject the Commission's theories, or Congress takes remedial
action, vigorous, informed, geographical competition will no longer be able to
exist except under the shadow of threatened litigation.'
It is the purpose of this article to discuss the development, use, and potential
future availability to the Commission (and the Commission's trial attorneys) of the
doctrine of implied conspiracy or "conscious parallelism of action," and to do so it
is first necessary to define the term.
The term "conscious parallelism of action" is a label for a legal theory which
represents a radical extension of a principle of law which is accepted without
question; that is, that cases may be proved by circumstantial evidence. The phrase
appears to have been coined by the Federal Trade Commission in the following
context :7
In the Rigid Steel Conduit case, the Commission found, and the circuit court agreed,
that adherence to an industry-wide basing point formula, with the knowledge that other
concerns are adhering to it also, constitutes in itself a violation of the Federal Trade
Commission Act by the individual adhering companies when price competition is thereby
eliminated. It would have been possible to describe this state of facts as a price con-
spiracy on the principle that, when a number of enterprises follow a parallel course of
action in the knowledge and contemplation of the fact that all are acting alike, they have,
in effect, formed an agreement. Instead of phrasing its charge in this way, the Com-
mission chose to rely on the obvious fact that the economic effect of identical prices
achieved through conscious parallel action is the same as that of similar prices achieved
through overt collusion, and, for this reason, the Commission treated the conscious
parallelism of action as violation of the Federal Trade Commission Act. Should the
Supreme Court sustain the Commission's view, the effect will be to simplify proof in
basing point cases, but to expose to proceedings under the Federal Trade Commission
"In my opinion, anyone who uses freight absorption, zone prices, or an individual universal de-
livered price system, operates under the shadow of illegality and certainly is taking a calculated risk ...
It is reasonable to say that 118,952 business enterprises will be concerned with these decisions." Com-
missioner Lowell B. Mason, in Hearings before the Subcommittee of Senate Committee on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce on S. Res. 241, 8oth Cong., 2d Sess. 66-67 (1948).
TNOTICE To THE STAFF: IN RE COMMISSION POLICY TowARu GEOGRAPHIC PRICING POLICIES, supra
note I, at 3. Since the publication of this statement, a staff attorney for the Commission has written to
the effect that, in his personal opinion, mere "conscious parallelism of action" without other evidence
will not support a finding of conspiracy. Wright, Collusion and Parallel Action in Delivered Price Sys-
tems, 37 Gao. L. J. 201, 215 (1949). In addition, the report of the subcommittee of the Senate Com-
mittee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce which investigated delivered pricing questions concluded that
the Commission "appears to have written off the theory that 'conscious parallel action,' absent conspiracy,
constitutes an unfair method of competition. ... SEN. Doc. No. 27, 8ist Cong., ist Sess. 62 (1949).
Yet, Walter Wooden, Associate General Counsel of the Commission, in a letter to the Honorable Wright
Patman, member of Congress, dated June 8, 1949, and published by Congressman Patman in a release
from his office dated June 14, 1949, made the following statement regarding S. soo8 (then pending
before the House): "The first section of the bill is frankly conceded by its author to be intended to
cancel the law of Count II of the Rigid Steel Conduit case [see discussion of this case, in/ra] and there
is little doubt that it does so. The result is that there would be no way of challenging a basing point
system except by establishing collusion in its operation. That would relegate us to the 5o-year-old test
of the Sherman Act and destroy the philosophy of 35 years' standing that the Commission was created
to arrest restraints of trade in their incipiency. . .. Unless the concept of incipient restraint of trade
can be applied to the basing point method of pricing the concept is an empty one and the Commission
loses the thing which differentiates it from the Department of Justice as a 'remedial agency.' " There seems
to have been little doubt in Mr. Wooden's mind that absent legislation to the contrary the doctrine of
"conscious parallelism of action" is or should be the law.
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Act only courses of action which might be regarded as collusive or destructive of price
competition.
Although the term "conscious parallelism of action" is used frequently through-
out this article, too much attention should not be centered on the phrase itself.
As will be shown, the Commission formulated the theory long before it applied
the label, and for reasons of expediency the label may, in the future, be discarded
by the Commission without abandonment of the theory. Because the term "im-
plied conspiracy doctrine" is such a broad one, however, it is convenient to use the
Commission's coined phrase throughout this article to mark off for examination the
extreme segment of that doctrine as the Commission's attorneys would apply it.
It seems clear that direct proof of agreement among competitors to adopt, use,
or alter' a delivered pricing method will support an order to cease and desist from
such agreement and from any similar agreement? It is also elementary law that
agreement or conspiracy may be proved by circumstantial as well as by direct evi-
dence.'" Throughout its history the Federal Trade Commission has been per-
mitted to rely upon inference in conspiracy cases." In principle, the doctrine of
implied conspiracy may be no more than the doctrine that conspiracy may be
found from circumstantial evidence. However, the Commission is now seeking to
apply the doctrine far beyond previous uses, producing a trend which, if unchecked,
will require no evidence of "conspiracy" in delivered pricing cases beyond the com-
mon use in an industry of a delivered pricing method, plus common knowledge
of such use, plus substantial uniformity of published (list) prices.' 2
I
HISTORY oF DOCTRINE
The evolution of the doctrine of "conscious parallelism of action" has been a
gradual one. Initially, the Commission's and its attorneys' approach to delivered
pricing appears to have been on the theory that it was a discriminatory and
"monopolistic" practice, but not necessarily a collusive practice. The "monopolistic"
theory is based on the argument that, under delivered pricing, certain phenomena
" In the Cement case, pledges were secured by the Institute from its members not to sell f.o.b. mill
to purchasers' trucks, and there were other findings of actual collusion (as distinguished from non-
collusive identity of action) with respect to the maintenance and operation of the basing point system.
In the Rigid Steel Conduit case, the question whether Chicago should be continued as a basing point
was collectively discussed; in fact, Chicago was originally made a basing point at a 1930 meeting of the
Association. There was also collective action to eliminate the Evanston basing point.
'The order may also prohibit the respondents from entering into, continuing or carrying out any
"planned common course of action." The significance of this phrase is discussed infra.
" Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers Ass'n v. United States, 234 U. S. 6oo, 612 (1914).
"Federal Trade Comm'n v. Pacific States Paper Trade Ass'n, 273 U. S. 52 (1927).
".-The requisite effect (i.e., restraint of trade) is presumed by the Commission, based upon its eco-
nomic argument (discussed infra) that systematic industry-wide use of a common delivered pricing
method stifles price competition among those using it. Knowledge of such effect on the part of the
users of the method may also be presumed (according to the Commission's theory), since a man is held
to contemplate the "logical" consequences of his acts. That the consequences may not appear logical to
him is, of course, immaterial if the Commission thinks they are so and can persuade the courts to agree.
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(e.g.,-identity of prices and rigidity of prices) may appear, and that these phenomena
are also observable in instances of monopoly. The argument seems to run that
anything which has the effects of monopoly is tantamount to monopoly and should
be unlawful.' 3 This, and the argument that delivered pricing is discriminatory,
were the chief bases on which representatives of the Commission, during the i93o's
and early 1940's, sought legislation outlawing delivered pricing.'4
Whether the Commission attacks industry-wide delivered pricing as "monop-
olistic" on the theory that it produces the effects of monopoly, or as "collusive" on
the theory that it produces the effects of a conspiracy would seem unimportant.
An effective conspiracy is tantamount to monopoly in the economic sense that it
produces the effects of monopoly. The distinction between the "monopolistic" and
the "collusive" approach to delivered pricing is important only in evaluating the
historical development of the "conscious parallelism of action" doctrine and showing
that its adherents are fundamentally interested in an end and not in the means
used to achieve it.
The Cement case'5 was the first attempt by the Commission to strike at deliv-
ered pricing on a theory of conspiracy,' 6 and a number of subsequently instituted
cases were brought on the same theory." In all of these cases, however, an attempt
was made by the Commission's attorneys to introduce evidence of conspiracy, i.e.,
evidence beyond the mere common use of a delivered pricing method with com-
mon knowledge of such use and uniformity of prices.' Such evidence as was in-
troduced gave rise to specific findings of conspiracy, beyond mere "conscious
parallelism of action," by the Commission," and where these findings were re-
viewed, the courts affirmed them as supported by substantial evidence as required
" See findings of Commission, United States Steel Corporation, 8 F.T.C. 1 (1924); statements of
Commissioner R. E. Freer, in Hearings before Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce on S. 4055,
74 th Cong., 2d Sess. 309 et seq. (1936); THE BASING POINT PROBLEM 4 (TNEC Monograph 42, 1941).
'4 Statement of R. E. Freer, Hearings, supra note 13; THE BASING POINT PROBLEM, supra note 13.
'
5 Federal Trade Comm'n v. Cement Institute, 333 U. S. 683 (1948).
It also contained a count charging price discrimination under the Robinson-Patman Act.
Bond Crown & Cork Co. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 176 F. 2d 974 (C. C. A. 4 th 1949);
Allied Paper Mills v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 168 F. 2d 6oo (C. C. A. 7th 1948), cert. denied, 336
U. S. 918 (1949); Triangle Conduit & Cable Co. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 168 F. 2d 175 (C. C. A.
7th 1948), af'd per curiam sub nom. Clayton Mark & Co. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 336 U. S. 956
(i949); Keasbey & Mattison Co. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, z59 F. 2d 940 (C. C. A. 6th 1947); Fort
Howard Paper Co. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 156 F. 2d 899 (C. C. A. 7th 3946), cert. denied, 329
U. S. 795 (1946); Milk & Ice Cream Can Institute v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 152 F. 2d 478 (C. C. A.
7 th 1946); United States Maltsters Ass'n v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 352 F. 2d 161 (C. C. A. 7 th 1945);
Eugene Dietzgen Co. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 142 F. 2d 321 (C. C. A. 7th 3944); American Chain
& Cable Co. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 139 F. ad 622 (C. C. A. 4 th 1944); Phelps Dodge Refining
Corp. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 139 F. 2d 393 (C. C. A. 2d 1943); Salt Producers Ass'n v. Federal
Trade Comm'n, 134 F. ad 354 (C. C. A. 7th 1943).
"s An exception is the second count of the Rigid Steel Conduit case, discussed infra; but treating
the case as a whole without separation as to counts, evidence of conspiracy was introduced, and a con-
spiracy was found as to all respondents except two. The first count was dismissed as to these two, but
they were found to have engaged in an unfair method of competition under the second purely by reason
of "conscious parallelism of action."
"0 For example, see note 8 supra.
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by the statute ° Thus, to date, representatives of the Commission are almost cor-
rect when they state that no case has yet been decided by the Commission or
courts in which delivered pricing has been outlawed as a collusive practice in the
absence of evidence of conspiracy beyond that required by the "conscious parallelism
of action" doctrine.2'
The first effort of the Commission to introduce the doctrine of "conscious
parallelism of action" into its cases was an indirect one. The cease and desist order
issued by the Commission in the Salt Producers case22 ordered the respondents to
cease and desist from "entering into, continuing or carrying out, or directing,
instigating, or cooperating in, any common course of action, mutual agreement,
combination, or conspiracy" wtih respect to the matters specified in the order,
among which was the establishment or maintenance of zone delivered pricing.
This was not a case wherein the Commission sought to prove conspiracy by evi-
dence merely of common use and knowledge of the delivered pricing method.
The complaint specifically charged collusion in the establishment of the zone
system, and the respondents filed answers admitting all of the material allegations
in the complaint.
Respondents in the Salt Producers case obtained review of the Commission's
order by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals,23 and, among other things, objected
to the phrase "common course of action." The Commission contended that it
meant nothing by the phrase except that a "common course of action" related to
respondents' "admitted combination,"' and the respondents conceded that the
Commission could validly prohibit a "common course of action" which was the
continuation of a conspiracy or was pursuant to an agreement 5 Respondents
argued, however, that the cease and desist order would be effective to prohibit such
activity without the words "common course of action."
The court decided that the disputed phrase should remain in the order but
that the word "planned" should be inserted before it, making it read "planned
common course of action." The court said that, with this modification, "only
illegal contractual arrangements will be subject to contempt proceedings. The
word 'planned' as here used is intended to cover any 'cooperative' or 'concerted'
action by [respondents] ... "26
Had the words "common course of action" remained unmodified and unex-
plained in the Salt Producers order, it would have been arguable in any action for
20 The statute requires in terms that the Commission's findings be supported only by "testimony,"
but this has been construed to mean "substantial evidence." See ArOaNEY GENERAL's MANUAL ON THE
ADMINISTRATIVE PROcEDuRE Aar 509 (1947).
21 CoRvcN D. EDwARUs, DOING BUSINESS UNDER THE LAW AS IT Now STANDS IN DELIVERED PIZCiNG
AND THE FUTURE o A ERICAN BUsINESS 93 (Chamber of Commerce of the United States, 1948); see
also SEN. Doc. No. 27, 8Xst Cong., Ist Sess. 46-63 (1949).
"
5Salt Producers Ass'n, 34 F.T.C. 38 (941).
"' Salt Producers Ass'n v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 134 F. 2d 354 (C. C. A. 7 th 1943).
" Id. at 357, n. 4.
2r id. at 357, n. 3.
2 ld. at 357-
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
violation of that order that evidence merely of parallel action in the use of a zone
pricing system, without more, would establish such violation. The addition of
the word "planned" and the definition of that term by the Seventh Circuit Court
of Appeals made it apparent that additional evidence would be required, but how
much and of what? These questions troubled the respondents in the Wire Rope
case2 7 against whom a cease and desist order was entered, containing the phrase
"planned common course of action," shortly after the decision of the court in the
Salt Producers case.
Respondents in the Wire Rope case petitioned the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals to review the order against them, particularly the phrase above mentioned,
and asked that that phrase be further modified so that, in an enforcement action,
evidence of a contemporaneous agreement to follow the common course of action
would be necessary. Those respondents pointed out that if two or more of them
should independently decide to continue using the zone delivered pricing method
which was found to have been the subject of agreement before the order was
issued, they could be charged with following a "common course of action" which
was "planned" in the sense that it had once been the subject of agreement, even
though it would no longer be "planned" because the decision to continue it would
be an independent and non-collusive one. The court refused to modify the order,
but in affirming it seemed to indicate that something more than bare identity of
action would be necessary as a basis for a compliance action2
A third attempt by industry to escape the uncertain implications of "planned
common course of action" failed in the Cement case, where the Supreme Court
expressly sanctioned use of the phrase.
Whether or not "planned common course of action" and its equivalent "planned
concerted action" mean the same thing as "conscious parallelism of action" too
"'American Chain & Cable Co. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 139 F. 2d 622 (C. C. A. 4th 1944).
2" "It does not seem to us that the order needs further clarification. It is of course true that a cease
and desist order must be certain and unambiguous in its prohibitive terms because business men must
operate under it at their peril . . . [citing cases). But, there can be no doubt that to sustain a charge
of violation of the order in this case it must be shown that the prohibited acts have been performed
as the result of an agreement or conspiracy, or as the result of a common course of action, that has
been agreed upon or planned between two or more persons. If, as the result of such agreement or plan,
the petitioners continue to cooperate in a common course of action which has been found to violate the
statute, they make themselves liable to the prescribed penalties; and they have no just cause for com-
plaint if in appraising the evidence in any case the triers of fact seek to determine whether there is any
relation or connection between their past illegal acts and the conduct under examination. If such a
relation or connection is found it may properly be condemned as a continuance of an unlawful con-
spiracy. Of course the influence of changed business conditions must be taken into account in reaching
a decision; but there is no reason to believe that the Federal Trade Commission will fail in its duty
in this respect or that the courts will hesitate to modify or reverse an order that is based on inferences
not supported by the evidence." Id. at 623-624.
"5 The Court said: "Respondents have objected to the phrase 'planned common course of action' in
the preamble. The objection is twofold; first, that it adds nothing to the words that immediately follow
it; and second, that if it does add anything, 'the Commission should be required to state what this
novel phrase means in this order and what it adds to the four words.' It seems quite clear to us what
the phrase means. It is merely an emphatic statement that the Commission is prohibiting concerted
action-planned concerted action. The Commission chose a phrase perhaps more readily understood by
businessmen than the accompanying legal words of like import." 333 U. S. 683, 728 (1948).
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closely resembles the famous debates on how many angels can stand on the point
of a pin.20 Suffice it to say that as a result of the Salt Producers, Wire Rope, and
Cement decisions, and the inclusion in most Federal Trade Commission orders in
conspiracy cases of the phrase "planned common course of action," no respondent
who is subject to a cease and desist order in a case in which conspiracy to use a
delivered pricing method has been found can afford the risk of continuing the
particular delivered pricing method, no matter how independently he arrives at his
decision to do so and no matter how lawful the independent use of that type of
delivered pricing method might otherwise be. To that extent, at least, the doc-
trine of "conscious parallelism of action" is already the law.
Where, however, the Commission is not proceeding for the enforcement of an
order against respondents already found to have conspired, but is seeking to estab-
lish initially that a delivered pricing method was collusively created or used, dif-
ferent considerations presently prevail; and determination of the status in. the law
of the doctrine of "conscious parallelism of action" requires careful appraisal. It
will be apparent from such appraisal that the only thing that is clear is that the
Commission has sought to make this doctrine the law.3'
The best known example of an attempt to make the doctrine of "conscious
parallelism of action" the law is the recent Rigid Steel Conduit caseY2  There, the
respondents were charged in two counts, one for conspiracy and the other for the
common use, with common knowledge of such use, of a basing point system. Evi-
dence was introduced under the first count upon the basis of which the Com-
mission found a conspiracy, and on review by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
the court said, "We think there was direct proof of the conspiracy. . . ... " The
second count, however, did not purport to charge conspiracy as such, but only
"conscious parallelism of action," and the Commission concluded, in effect, that
by their individual use of the basing point system, with individual knowledge of
its common use throughout the industry, each respondent had engaged in an unfair
method of competition in violation of the Federal Trade Commission ActY 4
The Commission's cease and desist order in the Rigid Steel- Conduit case, in
addition to provisions prohibiting any further combination, conspiracy, or "planned
common course of action," also contained a paragraph prohibiting each individual
respondent from using the basing point system previously used or any other method
of delivered pricing which would produce the effects of price uniformity or varying
"mill net returns" on sales to differently located customers0'
"o In the cease and desist order in the Rigid Steel Conduit case, the phrase "planned common course
of action" appears in the preamble to the Count I portion of the order, whereas the phrase "conscious
parallelism of action" was coined to describe the theory of Count 1I.
A few recent complaints have included the charge of engaging in a "common course of action."
National Lead Corp., Docket No. 5253; American Iron & Steel Institute, Docket No. 5508.
"' NOTICE TO STAFF: IN RE CoM isssoN POLICY TowARD GEoGRAPMc PRICING PRACnCES, supra note i.
"Triangle Conduit & Cable Co. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, x68 F. 2d 157 (C. C. A. 7 th 1948),
afl'd per curiam sub nom. Clayton Mark & Co. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 336 U. S. 956 (1949).
"' Id. at i8o. (Italics supplied.)
"' Rigid Steel Conduit Ass'n, 38 F.T.C. 534 (i944).
" "It is further ordered that each of the . . . respondents . . . do forthwith cease and desist from
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Under pressure of a legislative inquiry into the confused state of the law on de-
livered pricing, representatives of the Commission sought to rationalize this para-
graph in the Rigid Steel Conduit order merely as an appropriate remedy to dissipate
the effects of an actual conspiracy proved by direct evidence. 0 Considerable empha-
sis was placed by these spokesmen on the fact that the Rigid Steel Conduit case
was not one in which the Commission had relied solely on "conscious parallelism
of action" but one in which (under the first count of the complaint) both direct
and circumstantial evidence beyond mere "conscious parallelism of action" had been
adduced 7
This attempt in the legislative forum to renounce the "conscious parallelism of
action" doctrine ab initio was weakened by several factors: (i) the fact that two
respondents (Spang-Chalfant, Inc. and Clifton Conduit Company) were exonerated
by the Commission from any charge of conspiracy under the first count of the
Rigid Steel Conduit complaint but were nevertheless held to have engaged in an
unfair method of competition under the second count by reason of their individual
use of the basing point system with knowledge that other respondents were also
using it; (2) the Commission's language on page 3 of its October 12, 1948, state-
ment of "Commission Policy Toward Geographic Pricing Practices"; and (3) state-
ments to the Supreme Court in the Rigid Steel Conduit case to the effect that no
issue of conspiracy was presented by the second count of the complaint or by the
portion of the cease and desist order which required the respondents individually
to refrain from delivered pricingf8
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals had affirmed the Commission's findings
and order, in their entirety, in the Rigid Steel Conduit case, and, unfortunately for
doing any of the following things for the purpose or with the effect of systematically matching delivered-
price quotations with other of said respondents or producing the equivalent of such matched delivered
prices through systematic discriminations in the mill nets received on sales to different purchasers:
"(a) Quoting or selling rigid steel conduit at prices calculated or determined pursuant to, or in
accordance with, the basing-point delivered-price system.
"(b) Quoting or selling rigid steel conduit at delivered prices calculated as, or systematically equiv-
alent to, the sum of the price in effect at, plus a transportation charge factor from, any point other than
the actual shipping point.
"(c) Quoting or selling rigid steel conduit at delivered prices which systematically reflect the in-
clusion of a transportation factor greater or less than the actual cost of transportation from point of
shipment to destination.
"(d) Discriminating among purchasers by quoting or selling rigid steel conduit at prices which
systematically differ in terms of mill nets according to the location of purchasers, and which mill nets,
plus common carrier transportation charges to the respective locations of such purchasers, produce de-
livered costs identical with those to such purchasers from differently located respondents." 38 F.T.C.
534, 595-596 (1944).
"
6Hearings before the Subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee on S. zoo8, 8xst Cong.,
Ist Sess. 70 (1949).
" See Sheehy, The Legal and Factual Content of Recent Geographic Pricing Cases, 37 Ggo. L. J.
183, 193-196 (1949).
as 17 U. S. L. WEEK 3293, 3295 (1949). See also Brief for Federal Trade Comm'n, pp. 2, 21, 33,
Clayton Mark & Co. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 336 U. S. 956 (1949). However, the Government in
its brief did hold in reserve the contention that if the Court found the Commission lacked authority so
to deal with individual conduct, the controverted portion of the order was justified as a means of
effectively dissipating the consequences of the conspiracy. Id. at 3.
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those who hoped for a definitive clarification of the law on delivered pricing, the
Supreme Court, by reason of the disqualification of one of its members and the
equal division of the others, affirmed the Circuit Court's decision per curiam, with-
out opinion3 9
Thereafter, the respondents moved the Commission to reopen the proceeding
and modify the paragraph prohibiting individual delivered pricing, which motion
the Commission denied ° Thus the Commission's order stands, but weakened by
the Commission's own comments.4
II
THEouEs ADVANCED IN SUPPORT OF DOCTRINE
Upon what legal or other authorities did the attorneys for the Federal Trade
Commission seek to construct the doctrine of "conscious parallelism of action"? A
study of their briefs, public statements, and statements before Congressional com-
mittees, as well as certain court decisions, discloses that they relied upon a com-
bination of the following:
(I) their economic arguments before Congress during the 193o's and early
1940's that basing point systems are "monopolistic" because they are accompanied
by a rigidity and uniformity of prices which might also be found under conditions
of monopoly;'
(2) their argument that the case of Federal Trade Commission v. Beech-Nut
Packing Co.43 establishes the principle that the Commission can' find an unfair
method of competition in an individual action which restrains trade even though
it falls short of conspiracy; 44 and
(3) an attempt to draw an 'analogy between "conscious parallelism of action"
in the industry-wide use of delivered pricing and the factual situations which im-
pelled the courts to find the existence of conspiracies in restraint of trade in Inter-
state Circuit v. United States,45 Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures,4 and William
Goldman Theatres, Inc. v. Loew's, IncY4
336 U. S. 956 (i949)-
Rigid Steel Conduit Mfgrs., CCH TADE REG. SERV. 54 (Docket No. 4452, 1949). The order
stated in part: "The purpose of the requested modification is said to be to make clear that the order
does not prohibit any of the respondents, acting independently, from quoting or selling at delivered
prices or from absorbing freight. The Commission does not consider that the order in its present form
prohibits the independent practice of freight absorption or selling at delivered prices by individual sellers.
What the questioned portion of the order does prohibit is the continuance of the basing-point, delivered
price system, found to have been the subject of conspiracy, or any variation thereof which might be
accomplished through the practices specified in subparagraphs (a), (b), (c), or (d) when done, as
stated in the order, 'for the purpose or with the effect of systematically matching delivered price
quotations.' "
,SEN. Doc. No. 27, 81st Cong., ist Sess. 62 (949). See also portion of order quoted note 40, supra.
"See statement of Commissioner R. E. Freer, and TNEC Monograph 42, note 13, supra.
"257 U. S. 441 (1922)-
"Sheehy, supra note 37, at 194.
,306 U. S. 208 (1939).
,i5 F. 2d 877 (C. C. A. 7th 1945), rev'd on grounds not pertinent to this article, 327 U. S. 251
(1946).
"7 54 F. Supp. 1o1 (E. D. Pa. 1944), rev'd, 15 F. 2d 738 (C. C. A. 3d 1945), cert. denied, 334
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Analysis of these economic arguments and decisions shows that they will not
logically support the claim that "conscious parallelism of action" in the use of
delivered pricing methods is, without more, either an unfair method of competition
apart from conspiracy or sufficient evidence in and of itself of a conspiracy.
The argument that basing point systems are "monopolistic" because accompanied
by price uniformity and rigidity often found in conditions of actual monopoly is
necessarily based upon two theories: first, that uniformity and rigidity of prices
in basing point industries are caused by the basing point system and not by some-
thing else; and second, that uniformity and rigidity of prices must be regarded as
evidence of conspiracy or of a monopolistic condition, rather than as evidence of
competition, or at least evidence which may point impartially either way and which
should be regarded as inconclusive in the absence of other evidence.
The very fact that representatives of the Commission claim (with considerable
accuracy) that every delivered pricing case decided to date by the Commission or
courts (except those based entirely on the Robinson-Patman Act) has included
substantial evidence, or admissions by the respondents, of actual collusion to fix
prices, should suggest to the Commission that the cause of such price uniformity
and rigidity as was found in those cases was not the delivered pricing method but
the price-fixing conspiracy. As a matter of logic, it seems difficult to envision how
a simple delivered pricing method such as freight equalization" or "universal de-
livered pricing"49 could, in and of itself, without outside assistance in the form of
U. S. 81x (1948) (same case, x64 F. 2d io21 (C. C. A. 3d 1948)). (Here, as will be seen infra, the
decision technically did not rest on conspiracy but upon monopoly.)
48 By this term the writers refer to the practice of each (and every) manufacturer in an industry
quoting a price f.o.b. his mill and being willing to sell at that price to any buyer who wishes to buy
at the mill, whether in a truck or otherwise. Up to this point the practice would not offend the most
ardent proponent of strict f.o.b. mill pricing. However, in order to be free automatically to sell in terri-
tories closer to competitors' plants and to have a quoted list price readily available for such sales, each
manufacturer announces on its price list that it will "equalize freight" with any competing plant. This
means that the buyer pays the manufacturer's f.o.b. mill price and pays the carrier its full, actual charge
for transportation to destination. However, if such charge is greater than it would have been from
some competitor's mill which is closer freightwise to the buyer, then the buyer receives an allowance in
the amount of the difference. The foregoing description assumes that the f.o.b. mill prices of all
manufacturers are uniform. If they are not, the manufacturer will have to do more than merely
"equalize freight." In such case, if his f.o.b. mill price plus actual freight to the buyer is higher than
the f.o.b. mill price of any competitor, plus freight from that competitor's mill to the buyer, the
manufacturer will give the buyer an allowance in the amount of the difference. It is noteworthy that
Corwin D. Edwards, Chief Economist of the Federal Trade Commission, sees little danger of concen-
tration of economic power under "freight equalization," or under "universal delivered pricing" described
inlra, note 49. See Edwards, Geographic Price Formulas and the Concentration ol Economic Power, 37
GEo. L. J. 135, 147 (1949).
" By this term the writers refer to the practice of a manufacturer charging the same price delivered
at any destination in the United States. This is sometimes called the "postage stamp" method of selling
and is common in the case of many articles of consumer goods where freight is not an important element
of the price. The Commission is itself on record that this method of selling creates no inference of
collusion, even in the parallel action of a number of competitors, where the use of the method and the
uniformity of delivered prices have "simple and logical explanations in the nature of the market, the
product, and the transportation cost." See FTC, NoTIcE To Tm STAFF, IN RE CoMAMIssION POLICY
TowARaD GEOGRAPHIC PRICING PRACTICES 4 (October, 1948). See also FTC, PRICE BAsEs INQUIRY: TIL
BASING POINT FoRNULA AND CEMENT PRICES 13 (1932).
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either (I) a price-fixing agreement, (2) price leadership (lawful 50 or collusive),
or (3) the effect of competition on a homogeneous product,5 produce price uni-
formity or rigidity. Although such methods of selling enable a seller to meet
competitors' prices in distant markets, there is nothing in their operation that
anaesthetizes his will and prevents him from beating such competitors' prices where
he wishes.
The Commission's argument that industry-wide use of a delivered pricing
method in and of itself produces price uniformity and rigidity is analogous to its
argument in Tag Manufacturers Institute v. Federal Trade Commission.2  Re-
spondents in that case had a price reporting plan which the Commission con-
demned. The evidence showed that respondents followed their list prices in 75
per cent of the dollar value of the industry's sales and sold at "off-list" prices in
25 per cent of the dollar value of the industry's sales. Since there was considerable
uniformity among respondents' list prices, considerable uniformity prevailed in the
75 per cent of respondents' sales which were at list prices. The Commission found
from this evidence that the price reporting plan itself was the cause of such uni-
formity. As to this, in setting aside the Commission's cease and desist order, the
court said :
3
... The evidence does not ... warrant the Commission's finding that the effect of
the operation of the Tag Industry Agreements "has resulted in a substantial uniformity
of prices for tags and tag products among the respondent members." In the first place,
this implies that the instances of departure from uniformity are insignificant and unsub-
stantial-which certainly cannot be said. In the second place, there is no evidence that
such uniformity as has existed is a result of the operation of the Tag Industry Agreements,
for it does not appear whether there has been an increase or decrease of uniformity either
in list prices or in actual selling prices since the agreements have been in operation.
It seems significant that, even when arguing before the Temporary National
Economic Committee that the basing point system in the steel industry was a
"monopolistic practice" which in and of itself produced price uniformity, Walter
B. Wooden, then Assistant Chief Counsel, and Hugh E. White, Examiner, of
the Federal Trade Commission, were at pains to cite many printed pages of docu-
mentary evidence which they claimed showed actual collusion on prices, extras,
and delivery charges. 4  Thus, it appears that representatives of the Commission
are themselves reluctant to rest on the proposition that delivered price methods of
selling have any automatic ability to produce price uniformity.
It is beyond the scope of this article to enter the field of economic argument on
the subject of price uniformity and rigidity as evidence of conspiracy. The courts
have held that price uniformity may result from lawful price leadership,55 and in
=0 United States v. International Harvester Co., 274 U. S. 693, 708 (1927).
'a See Rodgers and Luedicke, Dynamic Competition, 27 HARv. Bus. REv. 237, 248 (1949).
1 574 F. 2d 452 (C. C. A. Ist 1949).
"Id. at 460. (Italics supplied.)
"THEa BAsINo POINT PROBLE (TNEC Monograph 42), supra note 13, at 93-107.
r" United States v. International Harvester Co., supra note 50; United States v. Standard Oil Co. of
New Jersey, 47 F. 2d 288, 316-317 (E. D. Mo. 1931).
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a series of questions and answers submitted to the Subcommittee on Trade Policies
of the Senate Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, the Federal Trade
Commission, through Commissioner Davis, took the following position: "
"Q. Do you think that identical prices can result from competition as well as
from conspiracy?
"A. Yes."
While it is difficult to see how simple forms of delivered pricing such as "freight
equalization '5 7 or the "universal delivered pricing" method" can logically be
accused of causing, in and of themselves, any greater uniformity or rigidity of
prices than would exist under any selling method which permitted several sellers
to compete in the same market,"' some forms of basing point pricing may become
so complex and rigid in their mechanical workings as logically to produce a greater
degree of rigidity and uniformity of prices than would obtain in their absence.
This is really the burden of the Commission's objection to "Pittsburgh Plus" in
the steel industry;60 to the multiple basing point system as it existed in the steel
industry during the days of T.N.E.C.;61 and to the multiple basing point systems
found in the Cement and Rigid Steel Conduit cases.62 However, in instances like
these it is likely that evidence of actual conspiracy to hold the system together
will be found. As has aptly been said by an attorney on the Commission's staff:"5
The necessity for identical transportation factors, for refusing to permit delivery to
trucks or water carriers, for preventing "diversion in transit," and for unified action in
every other respect in which a price advantage can be created for any seller, makes it
unlikely that such a system can be made to produce continued identity of prices without
leaving a trail of evidence sufficient to condemn the venture.
The second major argument used by attorneys for the Commission in construct-
ing the doctrine of "conscious parallelism of action" is that the Beech-Nut case
establishes the principle that the Commission can find an unfair method of com-
petition in individual action that falls short of conspiracy. In a footnote to its
' SEN. Doc. No. 27, 81st Cong., ist Sess. 62 (1949).
See note 48 supra.
See note 49 supra.
Strict f.o.b. mill pricing would logically provide direct price competition only at the boundaries
of the various sellers' territories, assuming only one mill at each production point. If two or more
competing mills were located at the same point, they would, of course, compete directly throughout
their territory, but in such case it seems logical that uniformity of prices would tend to exist among
them to the extent that their products were homogeneous. If price uniformity is to be blamed on the
pricing method, it could here be blamed upon the f.o,b. mill pricing method. Such method could also
be charged with responsibility for the uniformity of price which would be likely to occur at boundaries
between competing mill territories. The writers feel, however, that in neither of these instances, nor in
the case of the simpler forms of delivered pricing, can the method of selling logically be blamed for a
condition which will occur under any method of selling which permits sellers to compete in the same
market.
°United States Steel Corp., Docket No. 760, a0'd by consent Oct. 5, 1948 (C. C. A. 3d 1948).
"TIE BAsING POINT PROBLEM (TNEC Monograph 42, 1941), supra note 13.
"' See Edwards, supra note 48, at 135-146, wherein it is apparent that the systems he is describing
and criticizing involved non-basing point mills, organized "disciplining" of price-cutters, etc. Compare
this with his discussion of "freight equalization" and the uniform delivered price, id. at x47.
"' Wright, supra note 7, at 214. (Italics supplied.)
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majority opinion in the Cement case,"4 the Supreme Court cited the Beech-Nut case
as authority for the abstract proposition that the existence of a combination is not
an indispensable ingredient of an unfair method of competition under the Federal
Trade Commission Act. This statement was pure dictum because of the categorical
holding of the Court that the Commission's findings of combination were sup-
ported by evidence6
The Beech-Nut case involved a complex system established by the Beech-Nut
Packing Company for the purpose of policing violations of its "suggested" resale
prices. The earlier decision in United States v. Colgate66 had held that it was
lawful for a manufacturer to announce to its dealers suggested resale prices and
further to announce a policy of refusing to sell to those dealers who did not com-
ply with the suggestion, so long as no agreement was made and the dealer was
free to comply or not, risking only the possibility of being cut off from further
supplies by the manufacturer.
The Beech-Nut Company followed the principle of the Colgate case but went
further. It established a system involving black lists and white lists, encourage-
ment of dealers to report price-cutters, reinstatement of previously cut off dealers
upon satisfactory "assurances" that they would comply with the suggested prices
in the future, and the general organization of all dealers to cooperate in main-
taining the resale price policy of Beech-Nut.
The case was decided upon an agreed statement of facts upon which the Com-
mission felt constrained, for some reason, to make a specific finding that the
merchandising conduct of Beech-Nut did not "constitute a contract or contracts
whereby resale prices are fixed, maintained or enforced."67  The reviewing court
was thus forced into the position of determining the legality or illegality of the
system under the Federal Trade Commission Act, apart from any agreement, not-
withstanding that the Commission might well have found that the cooperative
activities between Beech-Nut and its dealers did constitute an agreement, com-
bination or conspiracy.
The Court upheld the Commission's conclusion that the Beech-Nut system was
an unfair method of competition, but it is noteworthy that the Court regarded the
Commission's cease and desist order as too broad and modified it to prohibit only
those activities of Beech-Nut which exceeded the simple suggestion of resale prices
and announcement of a refusal-to-sell policy, sanctioned by the Colgate decision.
Thus, the Court, unlike the Commission, was not prepared to deprive Beech-Nut
of the independent right to use a lawful selling method merely because its prior
use thereof had exceeded the bounds of legality by the addition of other practices
involving active cooperation with its dealers.
e4 333 U. S. 683, 721 n. t9 (1948).
" See Justice Burton dissenting, id. at 732-733.
:6 250 U. S. 300 (1919).
7'2 5 7 U. S. 441, 455 (1922).
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There seems little doubt that, in the Beech-Nut case, the cooperative activities
of Beech-Nut and its dealers were in fact collusive, even though there were no
formal written contracts with the dealers such as were condemned in Dr. Miles
Medical Company v. Park & Sons Company. 8 The Commission's finding that
the activities of Beech-Nut and its dealers did not constitute a "contract or con-
tracts" may be taken to mean merely that there were no contracts of the Dr. Miles
type, and the decision may then be rationalized on the principle that agreements
in restraint of trade may readily be implied from evidence as direct as that in the
Beech-Nut case. If not thus rationalized, the decision would seem to fit only the
principle of a hard case making bad law.
A majority of the Federal Trade Commission has taken the public position
that:"
Each seller may choose his own method of pricing provided that he does not conspire or
agree with his competitors and provided that he does not discriminate in price in the
manner prohibited by law and thereby injure competition or tend to create a monopoly.
A seller may absorb freight or absorb part of his manufacturing costs or any other costs
in order to in good faith meet an equally low price of a competitor.
If an individual seller may do these things, the fact that two or more competing
sellers do them independently should not be treated as an unfair method of com-
petition under the principle of the Beech-Nut case. If there was evidence of agree-
ment, then the agreement would be unlawful and should be prohibited. Evidence
of agreement might be spelled out of activities of the respondents beyond the mere
common use of a delivered pricing method with consciousness of such common
use, just as the activities of Beech-Nut and its dealers beyond the mere announce-
ment by Beech-Nut of suggested prices and a refusal-to-sell policy spelled out what
was in essence an agreement, despite the Commission's finding that they did not
constitute a "contract or contracts." But, as in the Beech-Nut case, the cease and
desist order should be modified if it prohibits any respondent from further use
of delivered pricing in the absence of agreement or unlawful discrimination in
such use. In this respect, it is submitted, the order in the Rigid Steel Conduit case
went too far.
The third major argument used by attorneys for the Commission in constructing
the doctrine of "conscious parallelism of action" is that common, conscious use of
the same delivered pricing method by competing members of an industry is analo-
gous to the factual situations which impelled the courts to find the existence of
conspiracies in restraint of trade in Interstate Circuit v. United States, Bigelow P.
RKO Radio Pictures, and William Goldman Theatres, Inc. v. Loew's, Inc.
The Interstate Circuit case arose out of a series of substantially identical contracts
between defendant Interstate, an important motion picture exhibitor in Texas, and
S2 2 0 U. S. 373 (1911).
o SEN'. Doc. No. 27, 8ist Cong., ist Sess. 62 (1949).
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eight major motion picture distributors.7  The District Court7' found that the
distributors had conspired among themselves and with Interstate with regard to
these contracts, and further that the contracts themselves violated the Sherman Act.
Appeal was taken directly to the Supreme Court, which affirmed.72
Had the Supreme Court stopped with its holding that the trial court's finding
of conspiracy among the distributors was supported by evidence, the case would
"oDefendant Interstate owned virtually all of the first-run moving picture theatres in six Texas cities.
The court found that it and an affiliated company, also a defendant, "dominate the motion picture
business in the cities where their theatres are located." In these cities, they were in competition with
moving picture theatres that showed Class A pictures in second runs (pictures shown for the second time
in the same city), and also pictures below Class A in quality. Interstate generally charged 40 cents
admission in its first-run theatres, while competing second-run theatres charged much lower prices, as
low as so or 15 cents, and also sometimes offered double features.
In July r934 Interstate's general manager wrote a letter to the local Texas branch managers of the
eight major motion picture distributors, stating in substance that Interstate would have to cut its 40-cent
admission price unless these distributors agreed that, in licensing their Class A films to second-run
theatres in the cities concerned, they would require the latter not to charge less than 25 cents admission
and not to run such films as part of any double feature program. The letter was a joint missive
addressed to all of the branch managers of the eight distributors, each of whom received a copy of it.
Each of the distributors' branch managers disclaimed authority to make any such agreement with
Interstate, and referred the matter to his principal. It appeared that conferences were then held by each
distributor separately with Interstate, and eventually each distributor entered into a contract with Inter-
state embodying substantially the terms of Interstate's demand. There was no direct evidence that the
distributors agreed or even conferred among themselves on the subject, but on the other hand no executive
officer or other official of the distributors, except the branch managers, appeared as a witness.
71 2o F. Supp. 868 (N. D. Tex. 1937),
" With respect to the evidence from which the district court drew its inference of conspiracy, the
Supreme Court said:
"The trial court drew the inference of agreement from the nature of the proposals made on behalf
of Interstate and Consolidated [Interstate's affiliate]; from the manner in which they were made; from
the substantial unanimity of action taken upon them by the distributors; and from the fact that appellants
did not call as witnesses any of the superior officials who negotiated the contracts with Interstate or any
official who, in the normal course of business, would have had knowledge of the existence or non-
existence of such an agreement among the distributors.... " 3o6 U. S. 2o8, 221 (1939).
The Court pointed out that each of the distributors had received a copy of the Interstate letter which
named on its face all of the distributors to whom it was sent. With respect to the subsequent unanimity
of action by the distributors, the Court said:
"... It taxes credulity to believe that the several distributors would, in the circumstances, have
accepted and put into operation with substantial unanimity such far-reaching changes in their business
methods without some understanding that all were to join, and we reject as beyond the range of
probability that it was the result of mere chance." Id. at 223.
With respect to appellants' arguments that inferences other than that of agreement might be drawn
from their acts, the Court said:
".. we decline to speculate whether there may have been other and more legitimate reasons for such
action not disclosed by the record, but which, if they existed, were known to appellants." Id. at 225.
(Italics supplied.)
The Court adverted to the fact that appellants had failed to put on the witness stand any officer or
person who knew or should have known of the existence or non-existence of any conspiracy among the
distributors. It said that when the proof supported the inference of conspiracy the burden of going for-
ward with evidence to explain or contradict it shifted to the appellants, but that they undertook to carry
out that burden only by calling as witnesses their local branch managers each of whom testified that
he had had no conferences with other distributors or their representatives. The Court then said:
" . . The failure under the circumstances to call as witnesses those officers who did have authority
to act for the distributors and who were in a position to know whether they had acted in pursuance of
an agreement is itself persuasive that their testimony, if given, would have been unfavorable to appel-
lants. The production of weak evidence when strong is available can lead only to the conclusion that
the strong would have been adverse. Clifton v. United States, 4 How. 242, 247. Silence then becomes
evidence of the most convincing character [citing other cases]." Id. at 226.
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have afforded little or no aid in the construction of the Federal Trade Commis-
sion's doctrine of "conscious parallelism of action," although it does, of course,
substantiate the undisputed doctrine that conspiracies can be found from circum-
stantial evidence. The circumstantial evidence in the Interstate case involved, how-
ever, far more than mere parallel action and consciousness of it in a situation where
parallel action is to be expected because induced by the legitimate desire to sell in
distant markets and the necessity of meeting competitors' prices in order to do so.
The distributors in the Interstate case made drastic changes in their business prac-
tices as the result of pressure put on them from the outside, i.e., by Interstate. It
is noteworthy that, in this part of its opinion, the Court supported the District
Court's finding that there had been a conspiracy among the distributors them-
selves, apart from their independent conferences with Interstate, and did not indi-
cate that in the absence of such a conspiracy, parallel action by the distributors
would have been unlawful. In fact, the stress laid by the Court on the absence
of testimony by the officers of the distributors implies that had such officers ex-
plained away or rebutted the prima facie case of conspiracy created by the circum-
stantial evidence in the record, the parallel action would have been lawful.
The Court, however, did not stop with its holding that the District Court's
finding of conspiracy was supported by the record, but continued with what it
is submitted may be characterized as dictum ;7 and it is this dictum which laid
the foundation for the Federal Trade Commission's doctrine of "conscious paral-
lelism of action":'
While the District Court's finding of an agreement of the distributors among them-
selves is supported by the evidence, we think that in the circumstances of this case such
agreement for the imposition of the restrictions upon subsequent-run exhibitors was not a
prerequisite to an unlawful conspiracy. It was enough that, knowing that concerted
action was contemplated and invited, the distributors gave their adherence to the scheme
and participated in it. Each distributor was advised that the others were asked to par-
ticipate; each knew that cooperation was essential to the successful operation of the plan.
They knew that the plan, if carried out, would result in a restraint of commerce, which,
we will presently point out, was unreasonable within the meaning of the Sherman Act;
and, knowing it, all participated in the plan. The evidence is persuasive that each dis-
tributor early became aware that the others had joined. With that knowledge they re-
newed the arrangement and carried it into effect for the two successive years.
It is elementary that an unlawful conspiracy may be and often is formed without
simultaneous action or agreement on the part of the conspirators. Schenck v. United
States, 253 Fed. 212, 213, aff'd 249 U. S. 47; Levey v. United States, 92 Fed. 2d 688, 69r.
Acceptance by competitors, without previous agreement, of an invitation to participate
in a plan, the necessary consequences of which, if carried out, is restraint of interstate
commerce, is sufficient to establish an unlawful conspiracy under the Sherman Act. East-
ern States Lumber Assn. v. United States, 234 U. S. 6oo; Lawlor v. Loewe, 235 U. S.
"
3This is doubly true because, in addition to the holding of conspiracy, the Supreme Court sustained
the lower court's judgment and decree upon the ground that each individual contract between a dis-
tributor and Interstate was a contract in unreasonable restraint of trade, apart from any conspiracy
among the distributors themselves.
74 3o6 U. S. 208, 226-7 (1939).
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522, 534; American Column Co. v. United States, 257 U. S. 377; United States v. Ameri-
can Linseed Oil Co., 262 U. S. 371.
Certain highlights in the foregoing quotation should be kept in mind. First,
the Court said that agreement among the distributors was not a prerequisite to an
unlawful conspiracy "in the circumstances of this case." Second, the knowledge
imputed to the distributors was not mere knowledge that parallel action existed but
knowledge that "concerted action was contemplated and invited." Third, knowl-
edge was required that the plan, if carried out, "would result in an [unreasonable]
restraint of commerce."
Each of these elements would distinguish this case from a situation in which
sellers independently and individually elected, for example, to sell at a price which
was the same delivered anywhere in the United States or to sell on a basis whereby
each equalized or absorbed freight with the others so as to sell in the others' terri-
tories. In such a situation, although parallel action would exist, it would not be
"invited" and would not necessarily be "contemplated." The condition would not
suddenly come into existence as the result of a plan circulated by one of the sellers
(or by an outsider) to all concerned. The situation would, moreover, be explain-
able in the nature of the homogeneity of the product and the necessity for meeting
competitors' prices, and there is no reason why the sellers would not take the wit-
ness stand, explain their individual and independent actions and the business rea-
sons which motivated them, and thus rebut any inference of conspiracy.
Moreover, in a simple delivered pricing situation of the type described, it could
not validly be said that the sellers, although they might know of the parallel action
in their industry (such knowledge being hard to avoid by an alert business man),
would be chargeable with knowledge that such parallel action restrained trade
unreasonably. Any argument to the contrary would have to be based on the Com-
mission's apparent view that price uniformity restrains trade whether it is the result
of conspiracy or competition, and the further view that where price uniformity
exists under a delivered pricing method, it is the method of selling and not some-
thing else that is the operating cause of it. We have already attempted to demon-
strate the unsoundness of both theories.
Thus, the Interstate Circuit decision does not justify the doctrine of "conscious
parallelism of action" as the Commission would seek to apply it, i.e., by proof only
of common use and common knowledge of the use of a delivered pricing method
in an industry, plus evidence of the uniformity of prices.
Language in the Bigelow and Goldman cases goes a little further in the direction
of the Commission's theory of "conscious parallelism of action" than does the
language of the Interstate Circuit case, but the cases do not support the theory.
The Bigelow case was a suit for treble damages under the Sherman and Clayton
Acts based upon an alleged conspiracy among motion picture distributors in Chi-
cago to maintain a distribution system under which minimum admission prices
of theatres were fixed, and each theatre was classified as to the period when it might
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exhibit feature films. 75  The case was tried before a jury on two alternative and
mutually exclusive theories,"8 one being that there was an unlawful conspiracy
among the distributor-defendants to maintain the distribution system, and the other
being that there was an unlawful conspiracy among the distributor-defendants (even
though their maintenance of the system might be non-collusive) to discriminate
against the plaintiffs' theatre in the matter of its classification. The jury returned
a general verdict for the plaintiffs and, on appeal, the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals undertook, by deductive reasoning, to ascertain upon which of the two
theories the jury had based its verdict. The court decided that the jury had based
its verdict on the first theory (conspiracy to maintain the system) and that such
verdict was supported by the evidence. However, it reversed the trial court's judg-
ment with instructions to enter judgment for the defendants non obstante veredicto
on the ground that the plaintiffs had not proved damages. Plaintiffs appealed to
the Supreme Court, which held that the plaintiffs had proved damages and reversed
the judgment of the court of appeals and affirmed that of the district court.
There is nothing in the opinions of either the circuit court of appeals or the
Supreme Court which sheds any light on the nature or scope of the evidence which
was held to support the jury's verdict of conspiracy to maintain the distribution
system.77 The following statement of the circuit court of appeals is the one
relied upon by the Federal Trade Commission as justification for its "conscious
parallelism of action" doctrine:"8
Knowing participation by competitors without previous agreement in a plan, the neces-
sary consequences of which if carried out is unreasonable restraint of interstate commerce,
is sufficient to establish an unlawful conspiracy.
In support of this statement the court cited the dictum hereinbefore quoted from
the Interstate Circuit case. However, without knowing the nature and scope of
the evidence which was before the jury, the statement must be regarded as dictum,
as it was in the Interstate Circuit case.79
5 Plaintiffs owned a theatre in a neighborhood section of the city which was in competition with
theatres owned by the film distributor-defendants. Plaintiffs' theatre, under the system, was not per-
mitted to exhibit feature films until ten weeks after such films had completed their showing in the
downtown Loop section of the city where the theatres were owned by the distributor-defendants. The
distribution system was uniform in all of its details among the distributor-defendants, i.e., the same
minimum admission prices were required by all distributor-defendants of each class of theatres and their
classification of theatres was uniform. Plaintiffs had sought, unsuccessfully, to have their theatre re-
classified into a more favorable grouping so it could obtain feature pictures a shorter time after they had
been shown in the Loop.
"' The circuit court of appeals held that the plaintiffs had admitted that the two theories were
mutually exclusive, and thus bound themselves by the admission, whether the theories would otherwise
have been so regarded or not.
"" Beyond outlining the general nature of the motion picture industry, the details of the distribution
system itself, the fact that all defendants used it, and the evidence regarding plaintiffs' damages, neither
court discussed the evidence at all, except that the circuit court of appeals said that ". .. no specific
agreement to enter into such conspiracy on the part of the defendants was proven.... . 150 F. 2d
877, 882 (C. C. A. 7 th 1945). This might, of course, mean only that no direct proof of agreement was
made but that there was sufficient circumstantial evidence beyond mere unanimity of action.
x5 o F. 2d 877, 882, 883 (C. C. A. 7 th 1945).
It is interesting that the circuit court of appeals distinguished two other cases: Gary Theatre Co. v.
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It is evident that the decision neither of the circuit court of appeals nor of
the Supreme Court80 in the Bigelow case, as written, can be said to have extended,
or made into law, the original dictum in the Interstate Circuit case.
The final case relied upon by the Commission to support its doctrine of "con-
scious parallelism of action" is the Goldman case. Plaintiff Goldman, lessee of a
downtown motion picture theatre in Philadelphia, was uniformly refused first-run
films by all distributors, although it offered higher rental fees than the single ex-
hibitor (Warner) which controlled all the other downtown theatres.8'
Plaintiff Goldman brought an action for an injunction and treble damages for
violation by the defendants of Sections i and 2 of the Sherman Act. The trial
court found that, with respect to Section I, "Uniformity of action ... without more,
is not evidence of agreement or conspiracy."8' 2  On the question of Section 2, the
lower court held, in substance, that while the effect of the distributors' contracts
to lease first-run pictures only to Warner was to give Warner a monopoly of such
pictures in Philadelphia, a monopoly of so small a part of commerce was not
unlawful unless there was an intent to monopolize, which he found did not exist.
He therefore entered judgment for defendants, and plaintiff appealed.
Columbia Pictures Corp., 12o F. 2d 891 (C. C. A. 7th 1941) and Westway Theatre v. Twentieth Century
Fox Film Corp., 3o F. Supp. 830 (Md. 1940), afl'd, 113 F. 2d 932 (C. C. A. 4 th X940) (in which the
defendants had also followed an identical distribution system for moving pictures), on the ground that
in each of those cases the district court had found no conspiracy and the circuit court of appeals was
bound by such finding of fact. If, as a matter of law, "conscious parallelism of action" is tantamount
to conspiracy, it would seem illogical to leave the trial courts and juries carte blanche discretion to decide
either way on the subject. The inference is that in the Bigelow case there was at least circumstantial
evidence of conspiracy beyond mere "conscious parallel action," while in the Gary and Westway cases
there was either no such additional evidence or evidence negativing any inference of conspiracy.
'0 Ile decision of the Supreme Court in the Bigelow case does not shed much light on the question
under discussion. In that Court, the defendants abandoned their attack on the jury's finding of con-
spiracy, and the sole question was whether the plaintiffs had proved damages. The Supreme Court
did say:
"There was evidence from which the jury could have found that respondents maintained in the
Chicago district, by a conspiracy among themselves, a discriminatory system of distributing motion pictures
for showing in successive weeks of release. 327 U. S. 251, 255 (1946).
And later it said:
" . . evidence was introduced in the course of the trial tending to show that respondents conspired
to maintain the release system as part of a conspiracy to maintain minimum admission prices to be
charged by exhibitors generally .. " Id. at 257.
These statements are, again, some indication that the evidence before the jury went beyond that of
mere "conscious parallelism of action."
" Distributors of motion pictures controlling the production and distribution of 8o per cent of the
feature pictures available for distribution in the United States had contracts with a single exhibitor
(Warner Brothers) owning seven first-run motion picture theatres in Philadelphia. These contracts re-
quired the distributors to furnish first-run feature pictures only to Warner. Plaintiff, who had been in
the motion picture exhibition business in Philadelphia for many years, rented a theatre in downtown
Philadelphia suitable for the showing of first-run pictures. Before doing so, plaintiff was informed by
one of the distributor-defendants that the latter would very likely lease him first-run pictures because
it was dissatisfied with Warner Brothers. However, after renting the theatre, plaintiff applied to all of
the distributors for first-run pictures and was uniformly refused by all, notwithstanding that it offered
them higher rental fees than Warner Brothers.
82 54 F. Supp. 1oss, 1013 (E. D. Pa. 1944).
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The Third Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the judgment and remanded the
case to the district court to take evidence with respect to plaintiff's damages and
to formulate an appropriate decree! 3
The decision of the circuit court of appeals contains somewhat indiscriminate
references to both "conspiracy" and "monopoly," but appears clearly to have been
based on a rejection of the lower court's holding that a local monopoly is not
unlawful without specific intent to monopolize8 4 While Section :Z of the Sherman
Act prohibits not only monopolization and attempts thereat but also combinations
and conspiracies to monopolize, the decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals can
be, and apparently is, rationalized on the theory that the effect of the contracts
between the distributors and Warner gave Warner an absolute monopoly of a
portion of interstate commerce, i.e., the showing of first-run pictures in Philadel-
phia, and that the limited nature of the monopoly did not exempt it from the
Sherman Act. The court's discussion of conspiracy, therefore, may well be re-
garded as dictum. However, it should not be ignored because it contains language
relied upon by the Federal Trade Commission to support its "conscious parallelism
of action" doctrine. The precise language is: 85
Uniform participation by competitors in a particular system of doing business where
each is aware of the other's activities, the effect of which is restraint of interstate com-
merce is sufficient to establish an unlawful conspiracy under the statutes before us.
As to the conspiracy charge, the court noted that the plaintiff had put on proof
of his own ability to operate a first-run theatre, the suitability of his theatre for
first-run pictures, and the uniform refusal of each distributor to lease him (or
anyone except Warner) first-run pictures. In addition the plaintiff showed that
he had served interrogatories on each of the defendani distributors asking why it
had refused him first-run pictures, and that their answers were evasive and not
factual or responsive. One answered that its arrangement with Warner gave it
"economic advantages"; another that it was "more advantageous"; a third that it
was "desirable"; and a fourth that it was "very satisfactory"--this in spite of the
fact that plaintiff had offered them more money for first-run pictures than Warner.
In view of this evidence,"' the Goldman case, it is submitted, cannot be regarded
1o F. 2d 738 (C. C. A. 3rd 1945).
84 That the circuit court based its decision on Section 2, not Section 1, of the Sherman Act is
apparent from its opening statement:
"The question we meet is whether plaintiff has supported its charge of illegal monopoly that de-
fendants have violated Section 2 of the Sherman Act . . . in order to support an action for injunctive
relief and triple damages under Section 4 of the Clayton Act. . . . Plaintiff relied too on Section i
of the Sherman Act . . . ; and while this section states an additional offense 'the two sections overlap
in the sense that a monopoly under Section 2 is a species of restraint of trade under Section x.' " Id. at
740.
I5 1d. at 745.
s8The court, commenting upon this evidence, said it showed that "there is concert of action in
what has been done and that this concert could not possibly be sheer coincidence. We think there must
have been some form of informal understanding." Id. at 743.
The Court then laid stress on the fact that defendants had put in no evidence at all to rebut or
explain the inference of conspiracy, and cited and quoted from the Interstate Circuit decision on the
failure of defendants in such situations to produce their responsible executive officers to testify.
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as authority for the "conscious parallelism of action" doctrine, as the Federal Trade
Commission would apply it to delivered pricing cases. Industry-wide use of de-
livered pricing has been loosely characterized by the Commission's spokesmen as a
"monopolistic" practice, but this charge has proceeded from the argument that de-
livered pricing is the cause of price uniformity and that price uniformity is an
evil in and of itself. In the Goldman case the result of the distributors' contracts
with Warner was a true monopoly, in the traditional sense of the term, even
though it applied to a limited geographical area and a limited product. Knowl-
edge of that fact on the part of the distributors was proved, but that knowledge
is far different from the mere knowledge acquired by a business man from his
dealings in the trade that he is using a delivered pricing method which is the same
as his competitors and that, when he meets competitors' prices, there will be price
uniformity.
The Goldman case may stand for the proposition that a seller may not safely
make a contract to sell exclusively to one buyer if he knows that all other sellers
are doing likewise with a resulting monopoly in that buyer. To the extent that the
Goldman case enters the field of implied conspiracy, however, it must be limited
to its facts, including the fact of actual monopoly and the fact that (as in the
Interstate Circuit case) the defendants refused to testify in an effort to explain
away the inference of an informal understanding.
III
PRESENT LEGAL STATUS OF DOCTRINE
However illogical may be thought the Commission's position in adopting and
advocating its "conscious parallelism of action" theory, as long as the Commission
occupies its present status as a "body of experts" that theory cannot be lightly
written off. The courts may be on the verge of changing the theory into a rule.
That this has not yet occurred, but that latent possibilities exist is shown by exami-
nation of (I) the Rigid Steel Conduit case, (2) the Supreme Court opinion in the
Cement case, (3) a series of opinions of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, and
(4) the Crown Manufacturers caseY7
The Rigid Steel Conduit case shows both the trend and its non-realization. On
the one hand is a cease and desist order embodying the "conscious parallelism of
action" theory, and affirmance of that order by both the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals and the Supreme Court. On the other hand, the Supreme Court affirmed
merely by virtue of a four-to-four vote. Neither court produced an opinion which
really upholds the "conscious parallelism of action" theory,88 and the Commission
has disclaimed the apparent effect of the case as a precedent.8 9
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, in its opinion, obviously erred in basing
its discussion of the Count II issues on the premise that: "In this situation, and
87 Bond Crown & Cork Co. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 176 F. 2d 974 (C. C. A. 4th 1949).
80 See note 43 supra.
8' There was no opinion by the Supreme Court, of course.
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indeed all parties to these proceedings agree, the legal question presented is identical
with the one the Supreme Court considered in the Federal Trade Commission v. Ce-
ment Institute case."9 The Rigid Steel Conduit case was argued to the Circuit Court of
Appeals on January 19, 1948, or several months before the Cement case was decided
by the Supreme Court. The issues decided by the circuit court of appeals in the
Cement case were (i) that the Commission failed to find a conspiracy, (2) that
assuming adequate findings of a conspiracy the evidence did not support such
findings, and (3) that in the absence of a conspiracy the use of the multiple basing
point system by the cement industry did not constitute an unfair method of com-
petition. It was this third issue decided by the circuit court of appeals to which
the comparison was made when the Rigid Steel Conduit case was argued in that
court. In subsequently deciding the Cement case, the Supreme Court held that
there were findings of a conspiracy and that the evidence did support such findings,
so that the Supreme Court, as Justice Burton's dissent points out,9 did not reach
the third issue which comprised the bulk of the lower court's opinion in the Cement
case.
Following this misapprehension, the circuit court of appeals in the Conduit case
quoted from the Supreme Court opinion in the Cement case language which prob-
ably is dictum and which certainly relates only to a minor collateral issue92 in that
case: 
9 3
... individual conduct, . . . which falls short of being a Sherman Act violation may
as a matter of law constitute an "unfair method of competition" prohibited by the Trade
Commission Act. A major purpose of that Act . . . was to enable the Commission to
restrain practices as "unfair" which, although not yet having grown into Sherman
Act dimensions, would most likely do so if left unrestrained. The Commission and the
courts were to determine what conduct, even though it might then be short of a Sher-
man Act violation, was an "unfair method of competition."
Without further discussion the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals then concluded
that it could not say the Commission was wrong in holding that the individual use
of the basing point method as used in the rigid steel conduit industry constituted
an unfair method of competition.
Thus the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals did not discuss the merits or de-
merits of the "conscious parallelism of action" theory, but apparently adopted the
view that the Commission, as a "body of experts," must be supported by the
reviewing courts.
Similarly, whatever significance" the Supreme Court's opinion in the Cement case
may have in this connection lies in the broad insistence that the conclusions of
the Federal Trade Commission must be accepted. There are two portions of the
opinion which the Commission might cite in support of its "conscious parallelism
90 168 F. 2d x75, 18i (C. C. A. 7th 1948).
" See 333 U. S. 683, 737 (1948), dissenting opinion of Justice Burton.
"The question whether Cement Mfrs. Protective Ass'n v. United States, 268 U. S. 588 (1925), was
controlling, or relevant, as to the issues in the instant case.
98 168 F. 2d 175, i81 (C. C. A. 7th 1948).
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of action" theory. One is that which was seized on by the Seventh Circuit Court
of Appeals in its Rigid Steel Conduit opinion, quoted supra. The other, in sub-
stance, was that the Commission was not wrong "in concluding that the delivered-
price system as here used provides an effective instrument which, if left free for
use of the respondents, would result in complete destruction of competition and
the establishment of monopoly, in the cement industry.... We uphold the Com-
mission's conclusion that the basing point delivered price system employed by
respondents is an unfair trade practice which the Trade Commission may sup-
press." 4  This statement was followed by a footnote to the effect that existence
of a combination is not an indispensable ingredient of an unfair method of
competition.
Neither of these points seems, however, to be directly pertinent to the question
of proof of implied conspiracy. Each seems rather to relate to possible authority
of the Federal Trade Commission to prohibit entirely individual use of delivered
price systems, which the Commission has disclaimed any intention of doing. How-
ever, these statements might be used by the Commission to support its contention
that collective use of a delivered price system for the purpose or with the effect of
"matching" prices is an unfair method of competition, although independent de-
livered price selling is not. The distinction between such a contention and the doc-
trine of "conscious parallelism of action" is, for practical purposes, non-existent.
Whether conspiracy is inferred automatically from a state of facts or such state of
facts is held illegal per se would seem unimportant except to metaphysicians.
In addition to the chance that the Commission may be granted power specifi-
cally to apply its "conscious parallelism of action" theory eo nomine, there is also
some possibility that the Commission may achieve an equivalent authority indirectly
by being supported in the calling of identical prices accompanied by delivered price
selling a conspiracy instead of "conscious parallelism of action," as the Commission
originally asserted it might do0' In a group of recent court decisions there is
a substantial quantity of dicta which, in the hands of clever brief writers and care-
less opinion writers, might ultimately be the vehicle for importing the theory of
"conscious parallelism of action" into the law by another name. These dicta occur
in five opinions of the same court, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, in five
delivered pricing cases where actual conspiracy was found to exist.
The first of this series is the Maltsters case.96 There the Federal Trade Com-
mission charged and found a direct price-fixing agreement, made effective in part
through use of a Chicago-plus, or single basing point, system. Although the re-
spondents were shown to have engaged in activities which under the substantial
evidence rule seemingly would have warranted affirmance of the Commission's
order without regard to the use of the delivered price system, the court said:"
04 333 U. S. 683, 720-721 (1948).
" See page 228 stupra.
" United States Maltsters Ass'n v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 152 F. 2d 16i (C. C. A. 7th 1945).
"I Id. at 164.
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The fact that petitioners utilized a system which enabled them to deliver malt at every
point of destination at exactly the same price is a persuasive circumstance in itself.
Especially is this so when it is considered that petitioners' plants are located in four dif-
ferent states and that the barley from which the malt is manufactured is procured from
eight or nine different states.
The Maltsters case was followed, chronologically, by the Milk Can case,"5 the
Crepe Paper case,99 the Rigid Steel Conduit case'0 0 (that portion of the opinion
dealing with Count I, the finding of a conspiracy), and the Book Paper case 10
In the Book Paper case the Court came close to inviting the Commission to put
the "conscious parallelism of action" theory into effect under a conspiracy label:102
The petitioners did with varying uniformity use the zoning system of price quoting,
and the existence of this plan which equalizes delivered prices of competitors having
widely different costs at a given destination, is strong evidence in itself of an agreement
to use such plan. [Citing Rigid Steel Conduit and Crepe Paper cases.] Moreover, a
uniform participation by competitors in a particular system of doing business, where
each is aware of the others' acts and where the egect is to restrain commerce, is sufficient
to establish an unlawful conspiracy. [Citing the Goldman case.]
It may be too much to hope that in future cases the courts will keep these quota-
tions in their proper frame of reference. In each of those five cases there was a
finding of a direct agreement to fix prices or otherwise restrain competition. There
seems to have been ample evidence for the reviewing court to sustain the Commis-
sion's finding of direct conspiracy, under the substantial evidence rule, without
considering the presence of the delivered price system. Therefore these cases do
not deserve to (although they may) be considered as precedents for the "conscious
parellelism of action" theory.
Finally, the Crown case'03 directly extends the implied conspiracy doctrine fur-
ther than any previous case, and to a point very little short of the degree herein
referred to as "conscious parallelism of action." The evidence which the Commis-
sion found to show a conspiracy to fix prices and restrain competition, and which
the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held sufficient to sustain such finding, con-
sisted of, in addition to use of a freight equalization system'0 4 and uniformity of
"SMilk & Ice Cream Can Institute v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 152 F. 2d 478 (C. C. A. 7th 1946).
" Fort Howard Paper Co. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 156 F. 2d 899 (C. C. A. 7th 1946).
...Triangle Conduit & Cable Co. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, A68 F. 2d 175 (C. C. A. 7 th 1948),
afl'd per curiam sub nom. Clayton Mark & Co. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 336 U. S. 956 (949).
"'Allied Paper Mills v. Federal Trade Comm'n, x68 F. 2d 6oo (C. C. A. 7th 1948), cert. denied,
336 U. S. 918 (1949).
1 Id. at 607. (Italics supplied.)
'"
3This case arose out of a proceeding by the Commission (Docket No. 4602) against x3 manufac-
turers of crowns (metal caps for beer and soft drink bottles) and their trade association. The complaint
and the cease and desist order charged and prohibited only a conspiracy to fix prices and restrain com-
petition, not containing any Count II, such as in the Rigid Steel Conduit case, raising the issue of indi-
vidual delivered price selling as an unfair method of competition. The trial examiner had recommended
dismissal of the complaint, having felt that the evidence showed no unlawful activities on the part of
either the trade association or the member companies.
104 Each manufacturer sold f.o.b. its own factory and announced that it would "equalize freight,"
i.e., lower its price sufficiently to compensate for the freight advantage of the competitor closest to the
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prices,' the following: (i) Standardization through the trade association of colors
and designs for "stock crowns" (crowns for soft drinks which show only the name
of the drink and not the name of the bottler);106 (2) discussion at a trade asso-
ciation meeting in 1928 of a standard sales contract the provisions of which, al-
though the contract was never adopted and used, were followed in large part by
the various manufacturers; 10 7 and (3) a series of patent license agreements between
the largest manufacturer in the industry and other manufacturers, which agree-
ments required the licensees not to sell at prices lower than those of the licensor,
and in connection therewith the furnishing of price information by the licensor to
the other manufacturers (this price maintenance provision of the patent licenses
was eliminated prior to institution of the proceedings by the Commission).
The significance of the Crown case in relation to "conscious parallelism of
action" is twofold:
First, it demonstrates with added emphasis the attitude of reviewing courts that
the inferring by the Commission of a conspiracy must not be set aside except under
the most extreme circumstances. In this case there was less substantial evidence
to support the inference than in any previous delivered price case. Also, there was
no evidence whatsoever that an improper purpose underlay any of the five practices
relied on, and there was some evidence of a. "normal business reason" for each.
However, the court said, "It is argued that all this is the result of the free play of
economic forces, but the Commission did not think so; and this is just the sort
of question that Congress intended the Commission to decide"' 08 (followed by a
quotation from the Cement opinion).
Second, it demonstrates the power of the Commission to infer a conspiracy in
virtually any industry where there is delivered price selling. Where delivered price
selling is found, there is ordinarily a homogeneous or standardized product and
there is ordinarily a high degree of price uniformity. These are the elements men-
customer's delivery point, if any. There was no evidence of any kind in the record of any agreement
to establish or continue this method of selling, an important difference from the Cement case.
... There was some evidence in the record that crown prices had been kept down in recent years
below what they otherwise might have been by pressure from bottlers of 5-cent soft drinks who desired
to maintain the 5-cent selling price in the face of rising costs. The court obviously was impressed not
only by the uniformity of prices among the respondents but also by the price rigidity-no change in
prices from late 1938 until the dosing of the record in x947. In stressing this point the court did
not mention the effect of OPA during five years of this period nor the 5-cent drink factor. Examination
of the opinion as a whole leaves a doubt that absence of this price rigidity would have caused a different
holding by the court.
2ooThe trial examiner found that such standardization was for the convenience of bottlers and users
of carbonated beverages and had nothing whatsoever to do with price fixing The findings of fact of
the Commission, without reciting any evidence that the standardization program was for the purpose of
price fixing, merely recite that buyers of stock crowns could not obtain any advantage in price by reason
of competition among the manufacturers in the realm of design, combinations of colors or appearance,
and the Commissioners inferred an understanding and combination to fix prices.
"° The draft of the contract embodied practices in effect prior to that time, so the fact that they
were thereafter followed does not indicate any change of business methods toward new and greater
uniformity.
20S 176 F. 2d 974, 981.
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tioned by the court in its summarization.' Until now, these three circumstances
in conjunction have not been generally regarded as necessarily indicating a con-
spiracy. Yet under this case the Federal Trade Commission seems to have dis-
cretion so to find. Here is new support for Commissioner Mason's vision of
thousands of potential respondents." 0
The implication from this group of recent cases, together with the failure of
Congress to agree on any delivered price legislation during the past year, is that
for the immediate future this portion of the body of antitrust law will be shaped
mainly by the policy makers at the Federal Trade Commission.
It is not improbable that the Commission will jettison the phrase "conscious
parallelism of action" while retaining the principle.
This change of approach is foreshadowed by numerous official statements by
the Commission, and semi-official statements by members of the Commission's staff,
during the year following the coining of the phrase." As has been noted, the
policy statement itself paves the way for substitution of the word "conspiracy."
Possibly some softer sounding word such as "understanding" may come into more
common use." 2  The phrase "tacit conspiracy" has been used by Mr. Corwin D.
Edwards, Director of the Bureau of Industrial Economics of the Federal Trade
Commission, in an exposition" 3 on this subject which, as a possible guide to the
current and future attitude of the Commission, deserves the most careful con-
sideration and evaluation.
IV
PROBLEM CREATED By DocTuNE
Although "conscious parallelism of action" has not yet achieved the status of
a legal principle, the trend in that direction has reached a point which requires
general awareness of its implications. Such awareness should bring an overwhelm-
ing demand for abandonment of this theory.
Culmination of the trend toward acceptance of the "conscious parallelism of
action" theory means mandatory uniform f.o.b. mill pricing just as surely as does
culmination of the trend embodied in the recent series of cases" 4 under the
Robinson-Patman Act dealing with delivered pricing.
Anything other than uniform f.o.b. mill pricing requires that sellers in most
industries have the right to adjust their prices by amounts exactly necessary to
109 id. at 979. Nor are the other two elements which are found here uncommon circumstances.
11 Heaings, supra note 6, at 66-72.
... See note 7 supra.
"'See par. 13 of Commission's findings in the Crown case, supra note 87, at 976.
"13 Edwards, supra note 21.
"Federal Trade Comm'n v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U. S. 37 (5948); Federal Trade Comm'n v.
Cement Institute, 333 U. S. 683 (1948); Corn Products Refining Co. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 324
U. S. 726 (1945); Federal Trade Comm'n v. A. E. Staley Mfg. Co., 324 U. S. 746 (945); Standard
Oil Co. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 173 F. 2d 210 (C. C. A. 7th 1949); see Corn Products Refining Co.,
FTC Docket No. 5502 (opinion of Commissioner Mason concurring in order denying motion to dismiss
complaint dated July 12, 1949).
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overcome the freight advantage of competitors 15 This may be done by what is
broadly called "freight absorption" or may take some other form. Inevitably it
must be systematic, and ordinarily it will result in substantial identity of published
(list) prices at any particular delivery point. As a practical business matter,116 there
is no middle ground between uniform f.o.b. mill pricing and "systematically match-
ing delivered price quotations" as that phrase is used by the Federal Trade Com-
mission, 17 except perhaps in industries with non-homogeneous products.
Such "matching" cannot be avoided. If A Company wants to do business in
the territory adjacent to B Company's plant, A Company must announce to these
prospective customers (or instruct its salesmen) that it will reduce its delivered
prices by the amount of B Company's freight advantage." 8 Thus A is "matching"
B's prices. Nor is there anything reciprocal-in any improper sense-in this situ-
ation. B is powerless to prevent A from invading B's territory by such freight
absorption, and A powerless to prevent B from doing the same thing. The only
thing B could do would be to lower its f.o.b. mill price to a point which would
require A to absorb so much freight as to make it unprofitable to do so. In actual
situations this is ordinarily not feasible. In most, if not all, industries where
delivered price methods are used, the freight between plants is a relatively small
portion of the total price, or there is some other precluding circumstance, such as a
constant shifting of predominant demand areas, seasonally or otherwise.
It is not necessary to debate here the economic merits of uniform f.o.b. mill
selling. It is assumed that mandatory uniform f.o.b. mill pricing is not desirable
as a matter of public policy. This assumption is supported by Congressional senti-
ment" 9 displayed since the Cement decision.
Continuously since that opinion was announced on April 26, 1948, Congress has
been wrestling with the problem of "re-legalizing" geographical competition
" This discussion relates, of course, to the considerable number of commodities generally referred
to as homogeneous or standardized.
... Any doubts as to the utter impracticability of non-systematic freight absorption should be dispelled
by study of the testimony of a great many witnesses from a considerable number of industries before
the Trade Policies Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce pursuant
to S. Res. 241, 8oth Cong., 2d Sess. (1948).117 lhe phrase derives its connotation in large part from its use in the Rigid Steel Conduit case.
See note 40 supra. The Commission has consistently striven to ignore the significance of non-identity
of actual off-list selling prices as contrasted to identity of published prices. It has sometimes asserted
that off-list selling merely constitutes instances of failure of a conspiracy to function.
In our opinion too much emphasis has been placed on sealed bids to Government agencies. See
Justice Burton's dissenting opinion in the Cement case, supra note 15, at 736 n. 8. Too little credence
has been given by the Commission to contentions of respondents that they have not bid at less than
published prices because of a fear that such action would lead their commercial customers to press for
similar price reductions. A recent example of the validity of this position is found in a news story to
the effect that lower prices bid to the Air Force on serge cloth had aroused hopes of men's clothing
manufacturers that they could obtain worsted at lower prices. N. Y. Journal of Commerce, July x5,
i949, p. 13, col. 3.
""
8 Any lesser reduction presumably would not enable A Company to make any sales. A greater
rcduction would raise a Robinson-Patman Act problem.
"" SEN. Doc. No. 27, 81st Cong., xst Sess. 64 (1949); H. R. REP. No. 869, 81st Cong., ist Sess.
2 (1949).
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through delivered price selling. Attention has been focused, however, on amend-
ing the Robinson-Patman Act, and no real effort has been made to deal with the
equally serious problem of the "conscious parallelism of action" theory under Sec-
tion 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act.
True, S. 236 20 made a stab at tackling this problem, and S. 1008121 also proposes
an amendment of Section 5. But it is highly doubtful that either bill, if enacted,
could prevent the Commission, as long as the present attitude continues, from
applying the "conscious parallelism of action" theory.
Therefore, since "conscious parallelism of action" will ultimately require uni-
form f.o.b. mill pricing, and since mandatory uniform f.o.b. mill pricing is not
desired, the crucial question is how to put an end to the "conscious parallelism of
action" theoryj 22  The problem is how to kill the weed itself, making sure that
it does not continue to flourish under a new name.
V
THE SOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM
This problem may be dealt with by the Congress, by the courts, and by the
Commission itself. Under the circumstances, positive action by all three seems
called for.
A. The Congress
It would be unfortunate should the Congress be forced to deal alone with this
whole problem. In addition to the practical difficulty of overcoming the uncom-
prehending political objections to "weakening the antitrust laws," the obstacle of
legislative draftsmanship seems to be considerable.
It would be a ticklish undertaking indeed to attempt to draft legislation which
would prevent a stubborn Commission and stubborn courts from following the lure
of "conscious parallelism of action," without at the same time imposing unwar-
rinted restrictions upon the power to find conspiracies from substantial, though
circumstantial, evidence. It would not be adequate merely to provide, along the
lines of S. 236, that common use of a delivered price system shall not alone be con-
sidered proof of a conspiracy, but that this fact may be considered as evidence' of
conspiracy in conjunction with other evidence. The effect of such a statute could
too easily be avoided by more or less evidence of other common but non-conspira-
torial business practices. 23
The role of Congress probably stops at merely making clear the Congressional
policy in general terms. The preamble to S. 236124 is one way this might be done.
120 8ist Cong., ist Sess. (1949).
x 81st Cong., ist Sess. (as passed by the Senate, 1949).
122 Amendment of the Robinson-Patman Act to forestall mandatory f.o.b. mill pricing via that route
is equally necessary, of course.
... See discussion of the Crown case, supra, pp. 250-252.
1' "Section x. In order to permit the treatment of transportation costs in interstate commerce to
contribute to the promotion of competition in American industry among all sellers for the business of all
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Or the policy declaration might be stronger, amounting to specific enactment of
the rule of reason. The Commission and the courts, it is hoped, would apply that
policy in individual case situations.
Because the trend toward "conscious parallelism of action" has gone so far in
decisions of the Commission and reviewing courts, a Congressional declaration of
policy is probably essential. Congress should also play a watchdog role to see that
its policy is being followed. If necessary thereafter, more detailed substantive
legislation should be attempted.
B. The Federal Trade Commission
The problem can best be solved by reorientation within the Federal Trade Com-
mission. This involves several steps: (i) abandonment of the views that delivered
price selling is economically bad and inherendy collusive; (2) abandonment of the
"conscious parallelism of action" theory; and (3) adoption of a "rule of reason"
approach to cases involving industry-wide delivered price selling.
The phrase "rule of reason" may not be an altogether happy one in this con-
nection but is used here for want of a better. This phrase, of course, connotes the
existence of a restraint on trade or competition and the determination whether such
restraint is unreasonable."" In delivered price cases the basic question is whether
there is any restraint. As to implied conspiracies, the term "rule of reason,"
as here used, means requiring more proof than coincidental use of ordinary, reason-
able (with reference to self-interest) business practices, looking under the surface
to weigh special circumstances of the industry involved, and searching for rather
than assuming the facts as to injury to the public' 26 Further, there should be
buyers; to safeguard and secure to American workers continued employment in the areas in which they
now make their homes; to promote the full development of our national resources, particularly in
presently sparsely settled areas, and effectively to utilize the vast transportation systems of the United
States, it is the policy of the Federal Government-
"(a) to develop a consistent and coordinated program of promoting competition, as affected by
transportation costs, in interstate commerce, by the Federal Trade Commission, the Civil Aeronautics
Board, the Post Office Department, and the Interstate Commerce Commission;
"(b) to foster competitive private enterprise by the treatment of transportation costs in interstate
commerce so that access to distant markets may be available, when economically feasible, to any com-
peting seller;
"(c) to encourage the Interstate Commerce Commission to continue and extend the policy of pro-
moting regional and sectional competition by the establishment of appropriate transportation rates where
required and in the best interests of the national economy;
"(d) to clarify the practice by the Federal Trade Commission which will permit all competing
sellers to have access to distant markets by directing the treatment of transportation costs in interstate
commerce to promote competition;
"(e) to prohibit the requiring of the sale of products at f.o.b. factory or mill prices, where buyer
and seller do not choose to transact business on such terms; and
"(f) to insure to all consumers the advantages of active competition in distribution of all products."
.. United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U. S. io6, 179-8o (1911).
12 General statements by the Commissioners to the Trade Policies Subcommittee of the Senate
Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, created pursuant to S. Res. 241, 8oth Cong., 2d Sess.
(1948), appear to indicate more of such searching than is indicated by analysis of recent decisions of
the Commission.
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consideration of the positive, not merely the negative, effects of complying with the
Commission's cease and desist orders' 2
It has frequently been said that the courts are not equipped to make the eco-
nomic determinations required in applying the rule of reason' 28 But the principal
reason for the creation of the Federal Trade Commission was to have an agency
so equipped. If the Commission refuses to exercise this responsibility, and applies
to Section 5 cases the per se doctrines of Sherman Act cases, then consideration
should be given to vesting sole jurisdiction of conspiracy cases in the district
courts 29 in order to give respondents the protection of jury trial, rules of evidence,
proof by preponderance of the evidence, etc.
The Federal Trade Commissioners should ponder on the words of Justice Jack-
son in his concurring opinion in the Krulewitch case3 0 These thought-provoking
words apply equally to findings of a conspiracy and findings of participation by
"fringe" conspirators.'3
Our experience with conspiracy cases in the antitrust field has convinced us that
unlawful collusion is not nearly so difficult to prove as is popularly supposed.1 2
Few businessmen are either willing liars or adroit ones. Where collusion exists a
reasonably competent trial attorney, having available the fruits of a reasonably effi-
cient field investigation, should have no great difficulty in obtaining enough admis-
sions by examining the businessmen involved, and their correspondence, to establish
the existence of the conspiracy either by direct evidence or by circumstantial evi-
dence so strong as to be almost the equivalent.
The present difficulty with the position of the Commission in this regard is that
it wants to be able to apply the "conscious parallelism of action" theory where
there is no conspiracy. The difficulty results from the fact that the Commission
has been controlled by economic views inconsistent with the policies of Congress
as to price leadership and competition on a geographic basis.
Hope for adoption of the "rule of reason" approach by the Commission seems
to rest mainly on the views of the new Commissioners. The hope cannot be
realized unless the new members of the Commission have or acquire sufficient back-
ground in the field of trade regulation to grasp the problem involved and sufficient
force of personality not to be subservient to the lawyers and economists on their
staff.
2
" See Clark, The Law and Economics of Basing Points: Appraisal and Propotals, 39 Am. ECON.
RaV. 430, 446-447 (x949); cf. Oppenheim, Should the Robinson-Patman Act be Amended? in CCH,
ROBINSON-PATMAN AcT SYMPOSiuM, SEcTioN ON FooD, DRUG AND CosraTIc LAw or rIM NEw Yoas
STATE BAR ASS'N 141 (1948).
128Cf. Federal Trade Comm'n v. Keppel & Bros., 291 U. S. 304, 314 (1934).
129 Statement on S. ioo8 submitted to the Subcommittee of Senate Judiciary Committee by Raymond
S. Smethurst, Counsel for NAM, in Hearings, supra note 36, at 120.
20 Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U. S. 440, 445 (1949).
... Compare the differing views in the Cement case, of the Supreme Court (333 U. S. at 719-720)
and the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit (57 F. 2d at 551-555). See also Justice Burton's
dissenting opinion (333 U. S. at 736-737).
1'2 See statement of John D. Clark, in Hearings before the Subcommittee on Study of Monopoly
Power of the House judiciary Committee, 8xst Cong., 2d Sess. (1949).
THE IMPLIED CONSPIRACY DOCnRNE AND DELIVERED PRICING
C. The Courts
The Supreme Court and the United States Courts of Appeal can make their
contribution by performing their function of judicial review in the real sense in-
tended by Congress.133 A conscientious court can, without too much difficulty,
require the Commission to depend on factually supported conclusions instead of
mere theories.'34
Also, the ever-present problem of careful opinion writing is particularly aggra-
vated in delivered price cases. The Supreme Court's Cement opinion has been
severely criticized by various members of Congress.' 5 The group of delivered
price-conspiracy opinions of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals'3 6 obviously
shows need for more understanding of the underlying situation.
Awareness on the part of these courts of the basic Congressional policy toward
the bona fide delivered price meeting of competition, and insistence that Federal
Trade Commission personnel do not substitute therefor their own theories, would
relieve Congress of the difficult task of legislating specifically against "conscious
parallelism of action." The problem is of such magnitude that if the Commission
and the courts do not solve it in a reasonable manner, Congress must sooner or
later become convinced of the necessity for substantive legislation.
... See the dissenting opinion of Justice Jackson in Federal Trade Comm'n v. Morton Salt Co., 334
U. S. 37, 58 (x948).
"'The most recint example is Tag Mfrs. Institute v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 174 F. 2d 452
(C. C. A. 1st 1949).3 95 Cong. Rec. 7157-7158 (May 31, 1949); id. at 9164, 9168 (July 6, 1949); id. at 9233-9234,
9237 (July 7, 1949); id. at 11554 (Aug. 12, 1949); H. R. RP. No. 869, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. i
(1949); Sat. Doc. No. 27, 8ist Cong., ist Sess. 5 (1949).
" See notes 96-ioi stpra.
